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This pa per a ims a t presenting the methodological approach to simulations, proposed at the 
beginning of the sixties by a gr oup of scholars of the Carnegie Mellon University. 
In that period, in fact, these scholars sta rted to work on computer progra ms a s a way to model 
human and economics beha viour. 
This pa per show the main features of such approach and its link with the general methodology 
that this resea rc h group proposed for ec onomic s, based on the need of more realistic hypothes i s 
as a way to get better expla na tions a nd previsions of the social phenomena. There is so, also a 
link between simulations a nd empirical analysis, that is, in fact, the point of departure and the way 
to test models. 
 
These works seem to have been neglected in the following development of Economics (for 
example the synthesis proposed by Clarkson and Simon, 1960, it is quoted j ust two times in all 
article available in Jstor a nd is never quoted in a s pecialized j ournal as Ja ss). 
The same Simon in a paper written some years la ter, notes tha t, while in normative 
microeconomics simula tions ha ve made large contributions, in positive microeconomics, their 
contribution has been modest (Simon, 1978), espec ially in dealing with organization (Simon, 
2000). 
It seems yet that the works under exa m can be useful in the actual debate on simulations, as 
many of the problems still to solve has just emerged. The solutions proposed are maybe not 
general, as ba sed on a behaviour al and cognitive approach, but are anyway worth of being 
considered. 
 
1. The different typologies of simulations 
 
The analysis sta rts from the paper of Herbert Simon and Geoffrey Clarkson - titled " Simulation of 
Individual and Group Behaviour" , published in 1960 in the American Economic R evi ew - in which 
they clarify many aspects of simulations, theory and econometric anal ys i s , and of their rec iproc a l 
relations. In the same period, other a uthors published also papers dea ling with simulations. Most 
of these scholars c ome from the same University as Simon. The papers were all published in 
important journals. 
 
C larkson and Simon define the following three kinds of simulation analysis. Among the three 
typologies of models there are, as usua l when dealing with classifications, some possible 
intersections, beyond many obvious points of contact. 
 1.A. Dynamic macr oeconomic 
The main examples a re the models used in the analysis of the business c yc le and market 
behaviour. This situa tions c a n be handled with differential and difference equations or with the 
method of comparative static. 
In this rea lm, simulations a re seen as a n additional tec hnique for numeric a l analysis tha t can be 
useful bec ause of computer speed and computational power. They can be used to manage more 
complexity and non linearity. 
 
The use of simulations represents here a development in mathematical and econometric 
techniques a nd is just a differ ent way to model a given situation. In fact, it is necessary to: (1) 
hypothesize a functional form of a function, (2) then it should be estimated with any of the 
available instruments; (3) at this point it's nec essa ry to define all initial values nec essa ry to the 
model. 
Simulations will then generate a s er ies of observations. Theri output is, in fact, a numer ical series 
and not a mathematical general relation. This series of numbers c a n then be directly compared 
with real data. 
In many cases it's possible that traditional ec onometric pr ocedur es give best results. In fact, here, 
a par t from starting values, all the numbers of the series a re generated by the program and then 
the input variables will probably be different from the real values, used in the traditional 
econometric anal ys i s .  
As observed by Cohen and C yert (in Cyert and March, 1964), these differences reflec t the fact that 
traditional models a re " one period change models" while simulations a re " process models", i.e. 
models c ha ra c terized by an internal evolution. 
When a model c ontain a feedback mechanisms, simulations c ould allow more accurate forecasting 
(an example is the analysis proposed by Cohen, 1960a). 
 
1.B. Normative models developed in the management sc ienc e 
In this rea lm the complexity of the environment can be managed more easily and with greater 
flexibility by simulations tha n by mathematical tec hniques a s linea r progra mming. 
The difference with the other two kinds of simulations is c lea r, as these models ha ve a nor mative 
dimension and not a pos itive one. 
This kind of simulations wa s very relevant and frequent in the period under exa m. Shubic k (1958) 
states tha t simulations wa s born in this rea lm (with military and management purposes). 
Also Simon (1978), looking back at the development of these techniques in economics a nd 
management, stress the relevance of such procedures for Americ a n Business firms, in dealing with 
their inventory, c ash-holdings a nd investment decisions. So the decisions proc edures of these 
organizations a re much different from the previous yea rs ones
1. These techniques a llow, 
sometimes, firms to take almost rational dec ision, or, at least, to apply more powerful heuristic s. 
 
It's not surprising that the first authors to propose this proc edure in Economics were scholars with 
an high tendency to interdisciplinary and with interest in management. 
The same reason could also explain the low interest solicited among traditional ec onomists. 
 
1.C. Economic decision-making 
Almost all ec onomics models a re based on some decision making process of an economic actor s .  
Also macroeconomic models c a n be read in this wa y. A demand curve, for exa mple, c an be seen 
as a r epr es entation of a s er ies of decisions. So point a and c have many areas of intersection. 
When we move from macro to micro models, and from normative to positive analysis, the 
behavioural elements bec a me more relevant. 
 
                                       
1 That's a n important notes to remember a lso for mod elling (american big) firm's beha viour. Again the usefulness of simulations is here related to the degree of complexity they allow to 
handle. 
There is a nother importa nt aspects, ac cording to the authors. C omputer a llows, in fact, also to 
build agents tha t manipulate symbols a nd information, different from numbers (like words or 
sentences). This c ha ra c teristic woul d permit to model situations in which the important factors 
cannot be represented as rea l numbers. Simon proposes two example of the limits imposed by the 
need to model all aspec ts with number: risk is represented with probability distribution and utility 
is a na lysed with a car dinal func tion. 
Important aspects in decision making, c annot be represented using numbers. C omputers c a n be 
programmed to allow a different modellization. 
 
The next two paragraph proposes two example of simulations developed by the authors under 
exam, and falling into this third category. 
 
1.C.I . The analysis and modelization of perc eption and memory storage of individual 
chess players 
 
Simon-Barenfeld (1969) and Simon-G ilmartin (1973) build a computer progra m to model 
perception and memory of chess pla yers. 
 
The analysis is ba sed on a detailed reconstruction of the real mec hanisms working in this 
situations tha t is useful to recall here and to relate to the characteristics of the simulation. 
 
During the first moments in which a s killed player is fa c ed with a new game position, he does not 
appear to engage in a s ear ch of possible moves. In fact, he seems to be gathering information on 
the problem. This finding results from a s er ies of empirical investigations, based on different 
procedures, like protocol analysis a nd experiment on perception (de Groot, 1965, 1966). 
 
Another empiric a l findings is then considered: the way in which individuals look at the new position 
they are exposed to. This a spec ts c a n be analysed using the record of eye movement (a pr ocedur e 
used also in other experiments, see for exa mple Rumiati, 1990). Suc h procedure (that can show 
the succession of fixations but not what information is being processed at each time) allows to 
observe that at each point of fixation the subj ect is a c quiring information about the location of a 
piece at or nea r the point observed, and also information on the pieces a round that bearing a 
significant relation to the fixed one. 
 
A firs t general aspec ts should be noticed: a lso the software designed to play chess by "selective 
search" (a s the one used by Simon) contain processes tha t can be labelled " perceptual" a nd it
￿
s 
then a possible way to model situations of this kind. Some kind of perception is, in fact, nec essary 
to allow a s elective search. 
Simon and Barenfeld simulate the initial sequenc e of the eye movements of human subjects using 
a pr ogr am called PERC EIVER. 
 
A part from the empirical analysis, the program requires a s er ies of other hypothesis, for exa mple: 
for ea c h of the pieces nea r to the one fixed, four a spec ts a re detected: (a ) if they defend the piece 
in exam, (b) if they attack it, (c) if they are defended by it, (d) if they are attacked by it. The order 
in which these items a re noticed is releva nt, as when a piece is notic ed for one of the reason seen, 
the fixation is moved on it. It is a lso necessary to define the starting point of fixation (a piece near 
to the centre of the board)
2. 
 
                                       
2 The author don
￿
t discuss the origins of fhese hypothesis a nd their releva nc e on the results. We
￿
ll c ome 
back on the problem of assumptions in simulations. Pictures 1b and 1c (in appendix), taken, from the paper under exa m, show a compar is on among 
the path of fixations of respectively an expert real player a nd a s imulated artificial player in the 
game position of picture 1a. Six of the human
￿
s player fixa tions fa ll in unoccupied s quares (these 
can be related to problems of calibration in the analysis of eye movement, or c a n have other 
unknown explanations), while the artificial player a lwa ys look at occupied squares. Nevertheless, 
Simon and Barenfel notic es a cons ider able concordance between the obj ects of attention in the 
two cases (the same pieces a nd the same relations with their neighbours; these aspects c a n be 
seen better looking also at the output of the program reporting in detail the aspects a na lyzed, see 
picture 2). It should be noticed that PERC EIVER
￿
s foc uses of attention don
￿
t rest on particular 
evaluation of the possible moves a nd development of the game, but just on a s er ies of simple 
search rules. 
At the end of the series of fixations, PERC EIVER identifies the Black pawn as under defended. Then 
it start a new exploration to find moves tha t could protect it (using the same perceptual proc esses 
as before). In this wa y it discovers three possible moves. One of this is disc overed in the same 
way by the human expert used as a benchmar k. 
 
The main aim of this exa mple is to show that a computer c a n use perceptual proc esses resembling 
those used by human subjects. PERC EIVER is, in fact, able to extract from the board almost the 
same information of a s killed human player. The detail of the processes should yet be best 
understood also because, there are important aspects unknown that should be hypothesized. The 
program can consequently be improved. 
 
There is a s econd aspects tha t define the human performance in chess ga me perception: the 
capacity to retain the information gathered and to reproduce it in the memory. This a spec t is 
reproduced with another progra m. 
Again, the analysis sta rts from experimental results showing that the ability of real players to 
reproduce a ches s position after a few seconds
￿
exposure to it depends sensitively on: 
a) his c hess profic ienc y and 
b) on the meaningfulness of the position. 
This is a ga in a centr al aspec t in the work under exa m, as Simon and Barenfel (p. 369) states tha t 
"an explanation of chess perc eption must be consistent with this da ta if it is to be regarded as 
satisfactory".  
The explanation should also be consistent with the known characteristics of human short and long 
term memory. Simon
￿
s a na lysis of this a spec ts is ba sed on the idea of chunck
3. Here it is defined 
as "a ny configuration that is fa milia r to the subj ect and can therefore be recognized by him. 
C hunks differs a mong individuals, in the case of chess, ac cording to their experienc e and level of 
skills.  
If a configur ation of relations is rec ognized as fa miliar it can be represented in memory by a s ingle 
chunk. In this wa y the short term memory can retain many more relations tha n if they must be 
held independently. Then expert players c a n retain in their short term memory much information, 
given an exposition of the same time. 
Subjects c a n usually held in their short term memory only about seven chunks (a nd in such a s hor t 
term they can probably transfer to long term memory only one chunk). 
 
This part of the perception process is simula ted using a pr ogr am called EPAM, that was origina lly 
developed in a different setting, where it was a b le to make correc t predictions on the effects of 
familiarity in rote verbal learning. 
 
The new complete program concatenate PERC EIVER and EPAM and aim to simulate the memory for 
chess position of both a weak and a mas ter c hess pla yer (Simon and Gilmartin, 1973). 
                                       
3 "C hunk is a technical term in psychology, meaning any unit of knowledge that has bec ome familiarized and 
has a place in the memory index. As it has a place in the index, a chunk is anything you can recognize in 
your field of expertise" (Simo n, 1997) It is c omposed by two main parts: 
(1) a lear ning component that stores in the long-term memory a var ying amounts of information 
about simple recurring patterns of pieces on a chess boa rd, proposed in a tr aining session; 
(2) a per for mance component that: (2a ) detects the pieces on the board; (2b) recognizes pa tterns 
(the recognition depend on the chunks -i.e. on the patterns - that have previously been stored in 
the long term memory; only these sequences c a n be recognized) and stores them in the short 
term memory (that is limited in capacity and than contain a maximum of seven names); (2c ) 
decodes the information in the short term memory and reproduces a s muc h of the original board 
position as possible. 
 
Picture 3 (in appendix) show the output of the second part of the program. 
 
To test the validity of the model, different nets of patterns were build by proposing to the program 
a s er ies of usual c hess positions (dra wn from games in the published literature). 
Two kinds of net were build, with different dimension, standing for different level of ability of a 
player (Simon and Chase, 1973, showed that chess skills d epends in large part upon a vas t and 
organized long term memory of chunks; see also Simon, 1978). 
The performance of MAPP in recognizing patterns wa s then compared (in different direction and in 
quantitative and qualitative terms) to that of an experimental sample of master a nd class A ches s 
players. It resulted again a qualitative resemblance between real and simulated behaviour (a 
similar perc enta ge of pattern recognised, the same pattern recognized more frequently). The 
program is then again able to account for the main features of the human performance. 
 
A neoclas sical representation of this situa tion would probably have lead to a model to generate the 
best moves. This progra m, on the contrary, try to account for rea l human decisions. 
As seen, the simulation just described are, in fact, based on a detailed reconstruction of the real 
human processes, in relation to the different steps of the perception mechanism of chess boa rd 
positions. The main distinctive features of such mechanisms a re empirically individuated and 
extrapolated from the reality, using many kind of methodologies: e xp e rime nts, protoc ol analysis, 
eye movement analysis … , and looking at analysis from different domain (not only from studies on 
chess, but also on memory; p e rc e p tion in other situations … ). 
These empirical prac tic es a re generally used in psychology. In economics they are widely not seen 
as useful or even "scientific", also because the interest is genera lly focused, at maximum, on 
testing models predic tions, and not in finding real hypothesis on behaviour. Neoc lassic al 
Economics, in fact, don
￿
t take care of the realism of its hypothesis.  
Experiments, so, should j ust reproduce the simple theoretical environment and are built to test 
theories. Different instruments, and different kind of experiments a nd of analysis a re necessary, on 
the contrary, when the interest is a lso directed to understanding real behaviour a nd not only in 
testing model (this is a s econd step in the empirical analysis a nd it requires different kind of data 
from the previous one) as I ha ve noted in Novarese (2003). In this pa per I ind iv id ua te d , yet, a 
new stream of experimental researc h (experimental c ognitive economics) whose aim is a lso that of 
entering the black box of human reasoning and than resembling the empirical methodologies 
recalled here (Simon is, in fact, one of the main reference of this new stream). 
 
As seen in the previous p a ra gra ph, is obvious tha t this kind of modelization requires na tura lly a 
simulation approach. 
 
Another importa nt aspects is rela ted to the generality of the proposed modellization. C hess is 
taken as a n example, of a mor e generalized kinds of situations. 
The same elementary processes tha t have been employed to simulate problem solving and 
learning in chess, operating in essentially the same way, produc e the same known features of the 
human perceptual performanc es in other perc eptive tasks. Therefore, similar progra ms revea led 
able to describe perception in different environment.  
This genera lity can be read in another direc tion too. Recalling also Simon, 1978, we can say that 
chess beha viour a na lysis stress the relevance of the information stored in long term memory. 
Direct retrieval of possible action as a r es ult of familiar pa ttern, provides a bas is for professiona l 
performance in many other a rea s. Where familiar situa tion are faced
4, we can expect more 
sophisticated behaviours a nd levels of performance, than in new areas. We should also expect that 
this model do not imply history-free path of action. On the contrary learning becomes more and 
more relevant. 
In chess, players differ in their skills, and the difference are related to their experienc e, both in 
term of number of board position seen, and of their c ha ra c teristic s. Two players with the same 
training (in term of number of position faced), can perform differently, if their c hunks differs, 
because of the different positions fa c ed in the past. So, individual knowledge of an individual is 
based on his own experience. This idea is c oherent with a path dependent analysis of learning 
mechanism and decision making (see Rizzello, 1999). 
 
This model c ould then represent a gener al referenc e for other models of learning, based on 
simulations, to be developed. 
 
In the same period, a s imilar methodologic a l approach (with more problems bec a use of the more 
complicated situations fa c ed ) were proposed also by Cyert and March, to describe and model the 
behaviour of another ec onomic agents : the firm
5. 
 
1.C.I I . The simulation of oligopolistic f ir m's behaviour 
 
The analysis proposed by Cyert and March (1964) represent a big effort to build a r ealistic theor y 
of the firm, empiric ally founded and going beyond the traditional ec onomic vi s i on (when the 
analysis wa s rea lized, the main theory of the firm was tha t proposed by the general equilibrium 
model; the theory of transaction cost was still not well know and studied). 
 
methodology of the empirical analysis 
 
The first part of the contribution in exam is, in fact, again based on an empirical analysis rea lized 
on the field, looking at several real organizations
￿
behaviour. 
The firm studied operate in oligopolistic mar kets . 
 
The empirical effort is ba sed on the analysis of 
a) different kind of internal doc umentations (rec eipts, letters, memoranda …),  
b) interviews with the members of the firms, 
c) direct observations of decision making processes (a member of the research group participated 
to the main meeting of some of the firms, eventually verbalizing it). 
Two experiments on organizational c ommunication complete the empirical evidenc e available. 
For exa mple the authors desc ribe four problems of decision, in which expectations, available 
information and their interpreta tion play a cr ucial role. 
 
main empirical results 
 
These last aspects a re central, bec ause firm
￿
s dec isions rely on estimations of alternatives costs 
and payoffs, and on a vis ion of the world that are generally partial and different from the reality, 
also because only a s ubs et of the possible available choices is genera lly taken into account. 
                                       
4 As pointed by Egidi, 2002, it
￿
s a lso possible that some pattern of ac tion can be extended to new situations, 
showing some elements of similarity with those in which a given strategy has been learned. 
5 Similar a ppr oach can be found in other of the applic ations developed in that period and surveyed in many 
of the paper rec a lled. Firm
￿
s orga niza tion and characteristic i nfl uence both perception and exploration of the alternatives. 
There are, besides, always c onflic t of interests a mong the different internal sub-groups. 
There is a lso a s tr ong inertia in the decision processes (a lterna tive more similar to those taken in 
the near pa st have an higher c ha nc e of being accepted). 
It
￿
s a lso relevant the order in which the different possibilities a re found and then evaluated. If 
alternatives a re generated sequentially, the first that allow a s atis ficing payoff is, in fact, chosen. 
 
a gener al model of firm behaviour a nd some applic ations 
 
This genera l findings a re used to propose a gener al theory of the decisions ma king into a complex 
organization. 
 
The general models is not formalized. It
￿
s ba sed on a s er ies of general ideas. 
The authors develop in detail some specific for malized models, as simplified examples of the 
possible applic ations of the general ideas. All these applications a re realized using computer 
simulations, that for the authors represent the natural theoretical language to model this theory. 
Even if the examples proposed are simplified in respect to the general model, in fact, simulations 
(and flow charts) are the only way to manage such complexity. 
The main problems rela ted to simulations a re also presented and discussed during the 
presentation of the examples. The book has a lso two methodological appendix, on simulations a nd 
on explanation and forecast in economics. We
￿
ll rec all them in the next paragraph. 
 
In synthesis the model proposed as exa mples a re the following. 
 
1) The first one is a particular model of duopoly, in which an ex-monopolist faces a " new firm". 
The main decision is rela ted to the level of the production. 
An important feature of all these models, is tha t firms ha ve a goal that represent both the 
variable(s) to take care (the variable to maximize in the neoclassical model) and a cr iter ia to take 
the main decision (the level that the variable should reach, i.e. a level of aspiration). The goal is 
here the profit. 
 
The decision are based on an estimation of the market price. The real pric e can be different from 
the estimated one. 
 
For both agents, the process sta rt with a for ecas t of demand, c osts, and of the reaction of the 
other firm and with the definition of the desired profit (based on a mean of the past profits; the 
ex-monopolist compute the mean on a longer number of years; the new firms ta ke also in exam its 
relative productive capacity). 
In the second phase, given the results of the previous step, eac h actors look for the best available 
choice. If such alternative don
￿
t allow to reach the desired profit, there is a new step in which the 
function of costs (a c c ording to the empirical analysis performed, C yert and March think that, 
because of the " inertia" o f each organization, there are always c osts tha t can be reduced, given 
appropriate conditions forc ing to do that; this proc ess or re-examination stimulate the firm to 
reduce its c ost; in the model under exa m, c osts a re reduce of a 10% p e rc e n t a g e ) and demand are 
estimated again. 
 
Picture 4 (in appendix) proposes a compar is on between the markets sha res of the two firms in the 
model and that of two real firms, in a duopoly similar to that under exa m (the two firms a re: the 
American Can Company and the new entrant is the Continental C an Company). 
 
This c ompa rison is not supposed to prove for itself the validity of the model, even if the fit is very 
good. Accor di ng to the authors, in fact, the model proves tha t given a s er ies of conditions, it is 
possible to fit the real data. The problems is rela ted to such assumptions. As in the model there are many degree of freedom (many parameters), it possible that a s et of its series c ould be able to 
fit the real data. Even if in this pa rtic ula r c a se, suc h parameters a re few, and most of them were 
defined a pr ior i, the difficulty remains. 
This is one of the main problem related to simulations, on which Cyert and March insist in the book 
and on which we
￿
ll c ome back later. 
 
2) Another exa mple is tha t of a department of a dis count. In this c a se the oligopolistic mar ket is 
composed by the three discounts of a city. 
According to the authors the model c ould be extended, with few differences, to the other 
departments of the same firm or to other disc ounts, as the decision processes a re very similar. 
 
The general goal of this orga niza tion are related to the sales a nd to the mark-up on the costs. 
These decisions a re taken accordingly to a gener al model (again based on empirical observations 
of the real func tioning of the department under exa m), based on four princ iples: 
 
a) the firm is seen as a coalition of individuals c ha ra c terized by different personal goals; the 
conflict that born from this situa tion is solved (or a t least the solution is sea rc hed, even if not 
necessarily successfully) thanks to: (i) the use of a " local rationality" (d ivision of the problems in 
sub-problems a ssigned to sub-units for the solutions, and then specialization in the decisions: for 
example sales depa rtment is the main responsible for sa les, the production department is the main 
responsible for produc tion …); (i i) the fact that the coherence of the rules is wea k (so allowing to 
keep together different goals); (iii) a s equential attention at the problems (with the consequent 
possibility of different an not coherent solutions in different moments); 
b) firms try to avoid, uncertainty, using rules of reaction in the short period and making the 
environment more known through negotiation (standard procedures, industrial traditions … );  
c) "problematic r es ear ch" : the search of new solutions is driven by the problems fa c ed (a 
mechanism of search different from more systematic ki nds ones, as the search aimed to 
understand: tec hnical approach vs. scienc e). Then search is oriented by one problem, and 
motivated by that problem. It
￿
s a lso distorted by the characteristics of the organization; 
d) organization learns a nd then evolves, modifying its goa ls a nd its rules. 
 
Picture 5 (in appendix) proposes a r epr es entation of the general func tioning of this proc edures, 
using a flow chart. 
 
This genera l model is spec ified (and partly simplified) for the department under exa m. 
 
Where possible, the previsions of this model are compared to the reality. The data available (i.e. 
the data gather ed by the firm) doesn
￿
t allow to test all parts of the model. 
There are good data on the prices a nd on the mark-up. Using as input the data on real c osts a nd 
on the classifications of each goods, the program produces a s output a pr ice for ea c h items. These 
prices c a n be compared to the real ones dec ided by the department. In the 95% o f the cases, the 
model gives a per fect prevision. The model has a good capacity to forecast also the liquidation 
prices of some items a nd the special offers (it is designed to individuate when a liquidation price or 
a s pecial promotion will be proposed) 
 
3) The last example proposed is a  general model on price and production for oligopolistic fi r ms. 
The program represents, for the author a fir s t attempt, to build a gener al model and should be 
further developed. 
 
In respect to the traditional models is yet much more complic ated, as it takes into account several 
aspects. 
 The choices tha t a fir m should take are: the price, the level of production and the marketing 
strategy. Eac h of them can be related to a s ub-division of the firm, that operate with a r elative 
independence from the other depa rtments. 
 
An (agent based) model of the oligopoly market results from the interaction of many firms, 
represented by a s imilar model but with different starting conditions a nd parameters. 
Firms intera c t both trough market price and demand, and with a r ecipr ocal attention when a pr ice 
should be defined. 
The model generates a detailed series of decisions, related to the internal results a nd aims , for 
each of the firms a nd a mar ket price and quantity. 
 
The analysis of this genera l model is just a first step, and allows a uthors to discuss a n important 
question: the relevance of the parameters on the general results of a s imulation. 
They try to individuate the parameters tha t have a s ignificant influence on the output. This 
analysis is ba sed on a r egr ession of the main output variable of the model on a s election of 
parameters. 
Some of them, show in fact, a s tr ong influence, while others seems to be less releva nt. 
As the authors sa y, this problems is rela ted to the lack of empirical observations on some aspects 
(when the research on the field started, the model and the parameters were, obviously, still to be 
planned, and so not all the empirical aspec ts releva nt for it were gathered; besides, there are 
aspects tha t cannot be seen). 
To solve this problem, some of the parameters should probably be modelled and get as results of 
learning mechanism of higher level. 
 
Simulations and the methodology of Ec onomic s 
 
As seen in the examples, simulations a re introduced by the authors under exa m, as a neces s ar y 
tool for ma na ging complex models, based on realistic hypothes i s founded on empirical findings of 
different types. The need for rea lism is a centr al point in the methodological program of this 
school, from which the other a spec ts follow in a r elated way and it is seen as a neces s ar y 
condition to allow a better c omprehension of the reality, and maybe also a better prevision, thanks 
to the fact that more complicated models c a n be performed using computers. The complic ation in 
models is strongly related to the search for more realism (Cohen 1960b). 
 
Unrealistic hypothes i s a re, yet, not refused a pr ior i (also in the models seen here there are many 
aspects not empirically tested) but cannot be accepted if they are proved to be false and if a mor e 
realistic one can be found (and should be found), independently from the performance of the 
model. 
Even traditional models a re not refused for itself. C omputer progra ms a llow to express theories in 
a new different mathematical languages a nd allow then new possibilities tha t can be added to the 
other a va ila ble languages (verba l language, graphic s a nd maths). 
When possible, simulations should be performed in parallel to traditional mathematic al models, has 
both of them has limits a nd advantages. 
Simulations a re less genera l, as they need more information than traditional models a nd their 
results a re a s er ies of number. That
￿
s not necessary a limit, it
￿
s just a different characteristics, that 
has ma ny positive implications. 
In fact, for exa mple, these series of number ma ke it possible to test immediately the theory more 
easily than traditional models. 
That
￿
s pa rtic ula rly important because using simulations it is possible, not only to handle very 
complex situations, but also to build theory that are intrinsically dynamic, and not only based on 
one period movements. 
As rea l data ar e dynamics, in this wa y it
￿
s ea sier to compare theory and reality (but again, 
empirical verific ation is not so relevant for some of the traditional ec onomist).  
C ohen 1960 proposes other positive elements rela ted to simulations. 
- In respect to aggregate economic model ling (Cohen 1960b), a micr o approach have many 
advantages. Markets, for exa mple, bec ome emergent phenomena, arising from the interaction of a 
series of firm (whose heterogeneity can also be modelled, while this c ha ra c teristic i s more difficult 
to be accounted for it in traditional mic ro models a nd it
￿




possible that factors tha t differ a mong agents a nd that are excluded by aggregate models (or tha t 
are not explainable by them) could compensate each other in aggregate set. But that
￿
s not 
necessary, as this individua l effec ts c a n also have a s tr ong effect on the general result. A micro 
modelization is then a better wa y to proceed. 
Even firms c a n be modelled as emerging from the individual charac teristic s of their members (see 
Novarese 2003, where the relevance of this a sp ec ts is empiric a lly analysed). C yert and March 
(1964) include, more or less direc tly, this a spec ts in their models, taking into account the conflic t 
of interests a nd the role played by the different departments in a or ganization. 
In simulations, heterogeneity can be related to some differences posed by the researches but can 
also results from different learning processes, given the same general model (as, for exa mple, in 
Simon analysis of different chess p la yers, that differs in relation to the length of the training and 
can differ a lso in relation to the positions fa c ed). 
- The assumptions a re easy to modify and change than in traditional analysis
7. 
 
This new methodology reflect themselves a lso in the relation with Econometrics tha t is not refused 
by a s imulation approach. There is on the contrary a need to interact. The new approach, besides, 
poses new problems a nd requirements (proposed by Choen 1960b as a nother c ritic a l fac tor for the 
development of simulations; C ohe n and March 1964 recall them and give some preliminary ideas 




The novelty of the approach under exa m and its a ttention to empirical analysis is reflec ted also in 
the variety of empirical data and analysis used. C onsider the following examples. 
- Simon and Chase, 1973, propose an experiment with a detailed analysis of the behaviour of just 
three chess pla yers. Their a im is tha t of understanding how they play, not to test a model. 
Experimental ec onomics is genera lly used to test theory and there is genera lly no attention in 
understanding why players beha ve in that given way (see Novarese 2003). 
- C yert and March proposes a s er ies of case studies, as a way to understand how firm takes 
decisions. 
                                       
6 But that has the disadvantage to increase the costs of the analysis, as it make necessa ry also a wider 
study to individuate all possible kinds of agents a nd to model them 
7 Simulations a llows to work with formal models a lso to non mathematical ec onomists. They should, yet, be 
able to manage computer simula tions. In the last years more and mor e economics c ourses are starting to 
include such skill, but in the 60s it was probably not so, and this c an be another fa c tors a ble to explain the 
low interest in this a pproa c h. 
The suitability of easy programming language were posed by the same Cohen as one of the crucial fac tors 
for the development of this a ppr oach. It
￿
s possible that the development of objec t oriented programmation 
helped to increase the role of simulations in economics (Prietula et al, 1978). 
C larkson and Simon (1960) and Simon (2000) pose also the attention on the relevance of the development 
of "heuristic pr ogr ammati on" a llowing to simulate system that manage non numerical values. 
8 It
￿
s not possible to analyse here this a spec t, that are j ust mentioned in the studies under exa m. In short, 
the problems rec a lled are related to:  
-criteria to postulate and estimate more complic ate functional forms ha ve to be developed, 
- the estimations of the parameters (to be done before the simulation is run and representing one of the 
possible way to solve the problem seen) poses other problems a s most of them can be generated by 
simultaneous equa tions of a model;  
- it is nec essa ry to devise test allowing to define the goodness of fit of simulated and real data (cons ider ing 
also that real data can have measure problems) C ase studies a re another tool that economics tend to avoid, for ma ny reasons. There is still no 
methodological agreement on how to conduct them and present their da ta
9. The main problems 
are related to the way decisions a re analyzed. The researcher c a n, also unconsciously, be 
influenced by his persona ideas a nd interest in gathering information. His presenc e can influence 
the behaviour of the subj ects under exa m. There is a lso an obvious problem of generality of the 
results found
10. 
Simon (1992, p. 20) has yet an answer to such criticism: "If you are trying to understand what 
firms a re and how they operate, you will learn a lot from this kind of very detailed study of the 
processes of decision … Of course, we should not stop with five firms. Biologists ha ve described 
millions of species of plants a nd animals in the world, and they think they
￿
ve hardly started the 
job. Now, I
￿
m not suggesting that we should go out and describe decision making in a million firm; 
but we might at least get on with the task and see if we can describe the first thousand. That 
doesn
￿
t immediately solve the aggregation problem, but surely, and in spite of the question of 
sampling, it is better to form an aggregate from detailed empirical knowledge of a thous and firms, 
or five, than from direct knowledge of none. But the latter is wha t we have been doing in 
economics for too many years". 
 
The authors in exam don
￿
t discuss in detail this spec ific pr obl ems of the empirical analysis 
(probably also because at that time there were a different status a mong economist for the 
empirical researc h; for exa mple the contemporary, more rigorous, way to present experimental 
results developed later, see Novarese and Rizzello 1999) but stress the need of getting better da ta 
and observations on real behaviour. as a condition for the development of simulation techniques 
and of the more general (behavioural) economic methodology. 
March and Grunberg (in Cyert and March, 1964, p 366) put the empirical analysis a s the starting 
point of their methodology. They think, in fact, that economics should be seen as pa rt of the study 
of human behaviour a nd than it need true empirical hypothesis tha t can be used in all c ontests 
and models. 
C ohen 1960a s tates tha t simulations a re especially adapted to the development of a behaviour al 
models of the firm at a micr o economic l evel . This sta tement can be extended to the general 
behavioural mic ro-modelization. 
To take full advantage of simulations, it is then necessary to obtain a gr eat body of empirical 
materials
11 (C ohen 1960a). C omputer progra ms c a n represent a fr amewor k around which organize 
the collection of data. 
This is a pos itive elements, but again also a pos s ible bound, as to develop a behaviour al approach, 
a lot of data ar e necessary and they should be very detailed and so complicated and costly to 
collec t (this c a n be another fa c tors a ble to explain the low success of this a pproach)
12. 
 





This pa per proposed an analysis of the methodological approach to economics developed and 
proposed by a s er ies of authors in the sixties. This a pproach can be defined cognitive and 
                                       
9 Also because of privac y problems of the firms under exa m. 
10 The fitness of the specific model proposed by Cyert and March can be also attributed to its pec uliarity and 
lack of generality. 
11 Simulations requires a lso a detailed analysis of working principles a nd institutions (in that there is a 
parallel with experimental ec onomic s). 
12 The costs c omprises also the " mental" d iffic ultie s of a mor e interdisciplinary approach by the economist 
that should be, in fact, less spec ia lized to perform it (in the recalled paper s, empiric a l analysis, theoretic al 
modelization and computer p rogra ms were all present together), losing the advantage of division of the 
labour. behavioural, because of the attention to real perc eption and decision making and to the role 
assigned to learning processes.  
 
One of the main point of departure is c onstituted by the wish to relay on more realistic 
assumptions, as a condition for better a under s tanding and forecast of the reality. This idea lead to 
the need of more data and of different empirical methodologies (see also Simon 2000). 
Simulations a re seen as the most important, even if not unique, way to modelise the resulting 
complexity. 
 
The papers disc ussed individuate a s er ies of problems a nd need, that are related to the kind of 
general approach pursued, but that have, in some cases, also a mor e general validity and s eems 
then useful for the contemporaneously debate on simulations (tha t is not necessarily linked to a 
behavioural approach and based on realistic as s umpti ons ), as ma ny of the problems seems to be 
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The vertical axis reports the ratio amont the market shares of the ex-monopolist and of the other 
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